Day: May 20, 2026

Last week, I travelled more than 10,000 km and spent 14 hours in the air to speak with Korean defence tech and military professionals about drone innovations in Ukraine. South Korea, a major defence producer, and Ukraine, an emerging defence tech hub, share similar security challenges and significant prospects for cooperation, which at this stage remain surprisingly limited. Through a series of meetings in Seoul, I tried to understand what is preventing this cooperation from moving closer.

Subscribe

Sometimes I still can’t believe that the influence of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor reaches this far. My communication with the defence sector in Korea began in the summer of 2025, when I was contacted by local journalist Joshua Bang of Drone Magazine in Seoul for an interview. One year later, I found myself visiting this beautiful country and engaging directly with its defence community.

Asia-Pacific is the region that I almost never cover in my newsletter, yet after this trip, I realized there are more similarities between our realities than differences.

The North Korea-Russia Factor

First of all, both South Korea and Ukraine have to deal with problematic nuclear-armed neighbours. Since North Korea joined Russia’s war effort against Ukraine — sending personnel and military equipment — ties between South Korea and Ukraine have gradually become closer, although it is still difficult to talk about any public or large-scale defence cooperation.

Reportedly, over 11,000 North Korean troops have been fighting alongside Russia against Ukraine. They are learning how to use drones for artillery correction and reconnaissance. They have extensively studied the use of small unmanned systems, including FPV drones. Ukrainian troops reported tactics where one soldier deliberately acted as bait for an FPV drone while two others attempted to shoot it down.

North Korea has supplied Russia with KN-series ballistic missiles that can be armed with a warhead of up to one tonne. Initially, these missiles lacked precision, but battlefield lessons improved their performance over time — meaning they can now kill Ukrainians with higher accuracy. Along with ballistic missiles, North Korea supplied Russia with long-range Koksan artillery, 240mm and 107mm MLRS, 60mm and 140mm mortars, cluster munitions, and 100mm shells for T-54/55 tanks.

In 2024, North Korea ordered the mass production of attack drones, demonstrating that it is actively studying the lessons of drone warfare and implementing them domestically.

In 2025, Ukraine managed to capture two North Korean soldiers. There have been recent reports that Kim Jong Un ordered North Korean troops to commit suicide rather than fall into Ukrainian captivity.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s military intelligence reported that North Korea plans to send 12,000 workers to the production facilities of Geran strike drones at Russia’s Alabuga plant.

South Korea and Ukraine: Current Cooperation

As North Korea’s involvement in the war grows, there have been repeated signals that South Korea may consider stronger support for Ukraine. At this stage, Seoul’s support remains limited to financial, humanitarian, and demining assistance.

• In 2023, the South Korean government handed over 10 Croatian robotic demining platforms by DOK-ING to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

• In 2024, Ukraine received 20 new ambulances from the government of South Korea.

• In 2025, Korea provided Ukraine with a new financial assistance package worth $100 million. In addition, Ukrainian medical institutions received 30 modern mobile X-ray systems from Korea’s government.

In 2023, there was also an indirect transfer of 300,000 155-millimeter shells to Ukraine through the United States during the Biden administration.

In Ukrainian media, there has been extensive discussion of what Korea could provide that would be highly valuable to Ukraine. The most obvious capabilities are air defence, which Ukraine critically lacks. South Korea operates a diverse range of air defence systems, including:

• MIM-104 Patriot — South Korea uses upgraded variants such as PAC-2 and PAC-3;

• K-SAAM — a Korean-developed air defence system designed to protect naval vessels from missile and aerial threats;

• KM-SAM — a medium-range South Korean air defence system developed using technologies derived from the Russian 9K37 Buk system;

• K30 Biho — a short-range self-propelled anti-aircraft system equipped with 30 mm automatic cannons and missiles;

• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) — a US-made missile defence system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere.

When it comes to US-made equipment, it is important to note that Korea cannot transfer such systems to any third party without approval from the United States.

In June 2024, it was reported that South Korea was considering supplying air defence systems to Ukraine after North Korea signed a new defence agreement with Russia. However, there were no additional public details or follow-up announcements, at least publicly.

As noted by Army Recognition, South Korea could transfer Soviet-designed armoured vehicles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including 43 T-80U tanks and 67 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.

Korea also possesses a broad range of domestic military capabilities, including K2 battle tanks, K9 Thunder howitzers — often considered among the most cost-effective artillery systems in the world — as well as domestic cruise and ballistic missile production. However, the transfer of lethal systems remains even less realistic than the transfer of defensive capabilities.

There are several obstacles limiting this support.

The first is the fear of escalation involving both North Korea and Russia. Moscow has repeatedly threatened South Korea over any increase in support for Ukraine. These threats sound very familiar to Europeans, as Russia routinely portrays countries assisting Ukraine as legitimate military targets.

For South Korea, however, such concerns are even more acute. The country exists in a highly complex neighbourhood involving North Korea, China, and Russia, making escalation risks especially sensitive.

In February 2026, reports emerged that South Korea was continuing discussions with NATO on additional measures to support Ukraine, including potential participation in the PURL mechanism. PURL enables the transfer of American military equipment to Ukraine using European or non-European funding sources. Russia warned that it would retaliate if South Korea participated in the PURL program in any capacity.

Secondly, the United States’ position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war remains highly relevant, as the US is South Korea’s most important strategic partner. South Korea hosts more than 70 US military bases, including Camp Humphreys, the largest US military base overseas. Today, about 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in Korea.

In May 2026, Seoul and Washington signed a letter of intent on drone and counter-drone cooperation. The two sides said they will work to establish a joint supply chain and develop shared standards for drone and counter-drone systems used by allied forces.

That said, while military support for Ukraine was generally encouraged under the Biden administration, under the Trump administration — which suspended military aid to Ukraine — the political atmosphere changed.

Share

Opportunities for Business Cooperation

At the business and innovation levels, however, cooperation between Korean and Ukrainian defence innovators remains highly feasible.

Before going on the trip, I reached out to several Ukrainian defence companies to ask what lessons from their success stories I could share with Korean startups. I received input from The Fourth Law, a producer of AI technologies; Odd Systems, a thermal camera manufacturer; and HIMERA, a producer of tactical communication systems.

All of the companies expressed a very positive view of the opportunities for defence partnership between Ukraine and South Korea.

HIMERA noted that both countries have strong expertise and indigenous technological solutions in the defence sector. The exchange of experience and technologies could significantly strengthen the capabilities of both sides and contribute to the development of more effective security solutions.

According to The Fourth Law, “Ukraine possesses unique experience in applying technologies in a full-scale war, as well as vast datasets for training AI systems. South Korea, meanwhile, holds leading positions in precision manufacturing and microelectronics. Combining Ukraine’s battlefield experience with Korea’s industrial and technological capabilities could become a pathway toward ¹shaping the future standards of global security”.

Although South Korea currently has around 600 drone producers, many primarily assemble systems from imported Chinese components, while only a limited number possess substantial domestic technological capabilities.

The level of integration of unmanned systems into the armed forces also appears limited. South Korea established the Drone Operations Command in 2023, yet just over two years later, the government decided to disband the organization due to overlapping responsibilities among military branches. The organization has not been disbanded yet. However, its role will change from conducting drone military operations to overseeing military drone policy, including overall drone procurement and research.

According to several interlocutors, the Korean military has only experimental use of aerial drones, while naval and ground drones remain almost absent from operational integration — despite the fact that local developers of such systems already exist.

Government and military stakeholders are generally aware of Ukraine’s success in drone warfare, but often lack a detailed understanding of how exactly these systems are used in combat. At the same time, I must honestly say that I was fortunate to meet several influential individuals whose knowledge of Ukrainian defence innovation and reforms was outstanding — in some cases even surpassing my own.

Many of the challenges facing Korea’s defence sector reminded me of issues I have observed elsewhere:

• Slow and bureaucratic procurement systems

• Insufficient communication between frontline users and defence startups

• Difficult access to government contracts for innovators

• The detachment of some developers from the real battlefield needs

I also learned that South Korean citizens need special government approval to visit Ukraine, a process that can take at least 30 days. This rule applies to conflict zones generally and is understandable from a security perspective, but it also directly limits the speed and efficiency of cooperation. Nevertheless, individuals who are truly determined to engage with Ukraine still go through this lengthy process.

From my personal experience, I saw strong interest among Korean contacts in learning from Ukraine and cooperating with Ukrainian innovators.

In my presentations, I spoke about the highly effective Brave1 cluster, which acts as a bridge between foreign investors, local innovators, military units, and government stakeholders. A great deal of interest was generated by the Brave1 Marketplace —an “Amazon for war” — where military units can directly view and procure available unmanned systems. For countries with traditional defence procurement systems, such mechanisms appear highly innovative and fascinating.

I also discussed the Test in Ukraine initiative, which allows foreign companies to validate defence and dual-use technologies at training grounds and with military units while receiving battlefield feedback. And, eventually, I mentioned Defence Tech Valley — Brave1’s large defence innovation exhibition already scheduled for September 2026, where Korean startups could network, learn, and meet potential partners.

That said, for cooperation between countries such as Ukraine and South Korea, the “green light” from the respective governments remains extremely important. Ukraine is currently prioritizing technology transfer agreements, so-called “Drone Deals”, primarily with its most trusted partners, particularly those that have signed bilateral security agreements. At present, there is no such agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea.

According to open sources, however, defence dialogue between the two countries is ongoing. Ministries meet regularly and discuss opportunities for cooperation. Therefore, it is entirely possible that some forms of cooperation already exist outside the public eye.

In terms of concrete areas of cooperation, South Korea’s extensive artillery production makes integrating unmanned systems into artillery correction particularly relevant. Ukraine’s experience with ISR drones would also be highly valuable for Korea. Likewise, Ukraine’s expertise in naval drones could offer important lessons, considering Korea’s large maritime territories

And finally, counter-UAS capabilities. North Korea has repeatedly conducted drone incursions into South Korean territory, making advanced radars, interceptors, and anti-drone systems increasingly important.

Both countries have significant potential for building resilient supply chain cooperation. One of the most common questions I was asked concerned Ukraine’s dependence on Chinese components. That dependency still exists. At the same time, Ukraine is focusing on localizing component production and establishing partnerships with other countries in this sector. According to the report Components of Freedom by The Snake Island Institute, some Korean-made components, including accumulator batteries, amplifiers, and communication components such as antennas, VTX/VRX, and TX/RX systems, present a viable alternative to Chinese ones.

Overall, I see enormous potential for deeper partnerships, currently constrained by political limitations and insufficient knowledge of opportunities to cooperate with Ukraine.

I would like to finish this piece on a personal note.

I was invited to Korea by Joshua Bang, who dedicated 10 years of his life to military service and was among the pioneers of drone usage in South Korea. Today, he works as a journalist at Drone Magazine and has gathered around himself a community of like-minded professionals who believe that Ukraine’s experience fighting aggression matters for the entire world.

Just as I crowdfund drones for my friends in Ukraine, Joshua personally crowdfunds and invests in bringing people like me to Korea to speak about the war and the lessons emerging from Ukraine. All of this is done with one purpose: to improve Korea’s military readiness to align with the realities of modern warfare.

And this is exactly what “people’s diplomacy” looks like — when official communication is constrained, but there is strong mutual interest, cooperation continues to develop on the private level.

Joshua is well-connected not only in Korea but across the broader Asia-Pacific region. If you are interested in expanding into Asia, he is an excellent focal point.

As I write this aboard my 14-hour flight back to Canada, I keep thinking about all the remarkable professional connections and friendships I made in Korea — connections that prove countries and societies must stand together in the face of common threats.

Loyalty is something our adversaries lack. Their partnerships are transactional, ad hoc, and driven by immediate self-interest. Once one link in that chain weakens, the rest abandon it. Armenia is an obvious example: it relied on Russia for security guarantees and was ultimately left alone.

Democracies, however, should follow a different trajectory.

I truly hope that my visit to Korea was useful for its defence community and will contribute, even in a small way, to future cooperation between our countries.

This is only the beginning! 🇰🇷 🇺🇦

I visited the Republic of Korea in my independent capacity as a defence analyst and author of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor. This gives me the freedom to engage with stakeholders and discuss security matters openly as a researcher, rather than from an official institutional position, which sometimes comes with its own limitations.

Consider supporting my independent research, for which I receive no sponsorship or additional funding. Your support not only motivates but also enables me to continue advancing my work.

Subscribe

Share