Day: January 3, 2026

Maduro’s last meeting in Caracas seems to have been with visiting Chinese officials. Probably a coincidence.BRICS News (@BRICSinfo)JUST IN: 🇨🇳🇻🇪 Chinese officials arrive in Venezuela for talks with President Nicolás Maduro.—  https://x.com/BRICSinfo/status/2007293252089815070

— Josh Rogin (@joshrogin) Jan 3, 2026

Senator Kim says Rubio and Hegseth “blatantly lied to Congress” by claiming there was no regime change goal in Venezuela. But hey, seems like Susie Wiles told the truth about it to Vanity Fair, so there’s that.Senator Andy Kim (@SenatorAndyKim)Secretaries Rubio and Hegseth looked every Senator in the eye a few weeks ago and said this wasn’t about regime change. I didn’t trust them then and we see now that they blatantly lied to Congress. Trump rejected our Constitutionally required approval process for armed conflict because the Administration knows the American people overwhelmingly reject risks pulling our nation into another war.

This strike doesn’t represent strength. It’s not sound foreign policy. It puts Americans at risk in Venezuela and the region, and it sends a horrible and disturbing signal to other powerful leaders across the globe that targeting a head of state is an acceptable policy for the U.S. government. This will further damage our reputation – already hurt by Trump’s policies around the world – and only isolate us in a time when we need our friends and allies more than ever.—  https://x.com/SenatorAndyKim/status/2007399987596906501

— Josh Rogin (@joshrogin) Jan 3, 2026

𝗔𝗿𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗪𝗮𝗿𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝗖𝗮𝘀𝘂𝘀 𝗕𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗶
𝙃𝙤𝙬 𝙖 𝙡𝙖𝙬 𝙚𝙣𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙘𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙧𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙗𝙚𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙪𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙩𝙤 𝙟𝙪𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙛𝙮 𝙖𝙞𝙧 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙞𝙠𝙚𝙨 𝙤𝙣 𝙨𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙚𝙞𝙜𝙣 𝙢𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙗𝙖𝙨𝙚𝙨, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙝𝙮 𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙜𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙨 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙡𝙚𝙛𝙩 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙣𝙤𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙗𝙪𝙩 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙞𝙜𝙝𝙩 𝙖𝙛𝙩𝙚𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙛𝙖𝙘𝙩.

“Marine helicopters do not fly combat missions over a foreign capital blasting loudspeakers announcing that an imminent strike is merely the legal act of serving an arrest warrant. Missile, rocket, and cannon fire, and the suppression of military bases, are not law enforcement signaling mechanisms. They are instruments of war. Calling them anything else does not change their nature.” — OSINT Intuit™

——

The emerging State Department legal justification for tonight’s strikes appears to be that US forces attacked Venezuelan military facilities in order to protect DEA personnel executing arrest warrants for Nicolás Maduro and his wife.

According to public statements by Mike Lee, citing a direct call with Marco Rubio, the kinetic action was framed as defensive. The argument is that the president may use inherent Article II authority to employ military force to protect US personnel from an actual or imminent threat while executing federal law enforcement actions such as serving arrest warrants.

With the operation now concluded, Maduro reportedly in US custody and no further kinetic action anticipated, the president’s swift execution presents Congress with a fait accompli. The action is complete. Congressional recourse is limited to investigation and oversight rather than prevention or authorization.

If this rationale stands, it implies that:

• US military force may be used preemptively to secure arrests abroad
• Host nation military resistance is treated as criminal obstruction rather than national defense
• Sovereignty becomes conditional on US prosecutorial interests

At minimum, this justification raises serious questions about proportionality, necessity, and the long-term consequences of redefining arrest protection as a basis for interstate military action. It mirrors the stretched legal theories historically used to justify summary executions of accused drug traffickers by reclassifying them as “narco-terrorists.” This is not a defensible legal framework. It is legal argumentation designed to provide post hoc cover for a completed operation, not a doctrine capable of withstanding sustained scrutiny by Congress, courts, or serious strategic analysts.

By contrast, prior uses of Article II authority to employ force abroad were justified on grounds of repelling armed attacks, degrading imminent threats, or protecting US forces already engaged in hostilities. They were not predicated on the execution of domestic arrest warrants or the facilitation of law enforcement actions inside a foreign capital. That distinction matters. Once military force is justified not by armed conflict but by prosecutorial objectives, the threshold for interstate violence shifts from necessity to convenience, and the constitutional guardrails meant to separate war from policing begin to erode. In that moment, the military ceases to function as a defender of national security and sovereignty and becomes an extension of the administration’s legal reach.

The more plausible explanation for this theory is not legal rigor but operational fear. A war-based justification would have required broader congressional notification, staff briefings, and advance coordination. That expands the circle of knowledge and increases leak risk. In an operation where the objective is physical custody of a head of state, even limited disclosure could result in flight, diplomatic sanctuary, or third-country protection.

Framing the action as a narrow, executive-controlled defensive measure reduced advance notice and preserved surprise. The justification also mirrors the logic previously used to deploy military forces into US cities such as Chicago, where the stated purpose was to protect federal officers during the execution of their legal duties. In both cases, military force is framed not as a response to armed conflict, but as a protective extension of law enforcement authority. The difference is scale, not theory.

Seen this way, the legal theory did not shape the operation. The operation shaped the legal theory. Congress was not sidelined because it was irrelevant, but because it was viewed as a liability at the staff level. That choice may have improved operational security, but it did so at the cost of legal durability and institutional norms.

This was not an absence of precedent. A Panama-style framework existed and could have been invoked, including arguments based on hostile acts or the unlawful seizure of US assets. Using it would have required admitting the action for what it was. An act of war. That admission appears to have been deliberately avoided.

#OSINT  #Venezuela  #Maduro

— OSINT Intuit™ (@UKikaski) Jan 3, 2026