Michael Novakhov@mikenovIf the story with Putin’s adoption is true (and I believe it is), it must be the major factor in his personal emotional life and his psychology as a leader. Vera Putina, his alleged natural mother, died in March of 2023, about the same time he started the Ukraine war. Did P

If diplomacy is theater, Justin Trudeau walked onstage in costume to greet royalty.The post Trudeau turns heads with odd fashion choice at King Charles’ historic speech first appeared on Brooklyn NY – bklyn-ny.com.

Встреча с Председателем Верхней палаты Парламента Таджикистана, председателем города Душанбе Рустамом Эмомали • Президент России kremlin.ru/events/preside…

Russia has strongly reacted to Germany’s decision to expand its military, with Foreign Minister Sergey Sergey Lavrov calling the plan to build Europe’s strongest army “very worrying.” Speaking at a security conference in Moscow, Lavrov criticized Berlin’s move to boost defence funding and expand troop deployments, warning that such actions evoke troubling memories of World War II. He argued that Germany’s military buildup, especially amid what Moscow sees as growing threats to Russia, poses a serious risk to regional stability. Lavrov’s remarks come as Berlin commits to strengthening its defence posture in response to continued tensions with Moscow.#russia #germany #lavrov #ukrainewar #militarybuildup #nato #europeansecurity #wwii #berlin #kremlin #defensepolicy #geopolitics #russianarmy #germanmilitary #sergeylavrovTimes Of India (TOI) Is The Largest Selling English Daily In The World. Times Of India Videos Bring You Global News, Views And Sharp Analysis. We Track India’s Global Rise, Her Increasing Engagement With The World, The Changing Geopolitical Landscape Amid Conflicts And Wars And The Emerging World Order. INTERNATIONAL NEWS | GLOBAL CONFLICTS | MIDDLE EAST WAR | CHANGING WORLD ORDER #TOILive | #TOIVideos Subscribe to the Times Of India YT channel and press the bell icon to get notified when we go live.Visit our website https://www.timesofindia.com/Follow us on X/ @timesofindia Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TimesofIndiaInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/timesofindia/Download the app: http://toi.in/3SLUCa80Follow the TOI WhatsApp channel: https://bit.ly/3RYl0J9For daily news & updates and exclusive stories, follow the Times of India

Survival has remained the most fundamental principle in the minds of Armenians. Despite genocide, ethnic cleansing and a geopolitical location at the crossroads of hostile neighbors, the survival of Armenian civilization for over 2,000 years is tremendously impressive. Since at least the 2016 Four-Day War, serious questions have been raised regarding Yerevan’s national security strategy, military preparedness and arms procurement. In a 2022 academic article for the U.S. Army War College, Armenian Colonel Zhirayr Amirkhanyan wrote: “The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020) was flawed military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union.” Colonel Amirkhanyan, who is the current Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff at the Armenian Ministry of Defense, articulated three crucial arguments. First, he analyzed how Azerbaijan was able to defeat his country’s armed forces. Second, he criticized Soviet doctrine as a viable method of warfighting for Armenia. Third, he outlined several lessons Yerevan failed to learn in the 30-year period between the first and second Nagorno-Karabakh wars. This analysis will bulwark Colonel Amirkhanyan’s criticism of Armenia’s reliance on the Soviet method of warfighting. It will offer new considerations for Yerevan to focus on maneuver and survivability.  Soviet attrition warfare works for some, but not for Armenia Soviet military doctrine was unique in its strict top-down hierarchy, leveraging overwhelming mass to outmatch and exhaust the enemy through protracted attritional warfighting. “Attrition” means to grind down the opposition through sustained attacks and pressure, forcing the enemy to expend resources. If one side cannot—or will not—exert the necessary manpower, firepower or economic strength, among other methods of state power, the losing side will be compelled to cede most or all of its authority to the winning side. The Soviet attritional model has been heavily used by each side in the Russia-Ukraine War. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff and a leading modern Russian military strategist, has praised Soviet military doctrine forefathers like Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin. Through attrition warfare, Moscow has utilized a similar Soviet-style approach in Ukraine which, despite taking more casualties, may ultimately succeed. Yet, Russia can afford to wage such a war, whereas Armenia cannot. The Armenian Armed Forces’ (AAF) reliance on Soviet military doctrine comes from its legacy as a former Soviet Republic and leadership historically trained in Soviet-style thinking. However, it is difficult to compare modern Armenia’s security posture to the Soviet Union, Russia Federation or Ukraine. Armenia is drastically smaller in size and population. Consider how many casualties the Soviet Union’s Red Army suffered in Stalingrad alone, or how Nazi Germany was able to capture vast amounts of Soviet territory before its Eastern Front collapse. Would the same Soviet method of attritional warfighting work against an Azerbaijani offensive with possible Turkish support? No. A call for Yerevan to “maneuver” If Armenia cannot leverage Soviet attritional warfighting, then what should replace it? Colonel Amirkhanyan suggests “maneuver warfare.” He wrote: “Soviet-legacy operational concepts prevented the Armenian forces from conducting maneuver warfare during the war proper and preordained decisions…well before the hot phase of the conflict.” In other words, Colonel Amirkhanyan desires to change Yerevan’s warfighting doctrine from Soviet attritional warfare to the opposite spectrum, “maneuver,” a modern Western school of thought. When Azerbaijan attacks swiftly with combined arms, including heavy precision fires, one-way-attack and air-to-ground drones, Armenia simply cannot win through attrition. Yerevan lacks the capabilities and resources to fight in the same way Russia and Ukraine do. …and incorporate doctrine for “survivability” In addition to maneuver doctrine, the AAF should prioritize the continuation of operations over individual battles—especially where there is low confidence in victory. For example, terrain that may not prove vital to national defense goals may be sacrificed if it means that operations can continue to support other high-priority objectives. The AAF must be designed to accommodate and save as many military lives as possible, ensuring continued operations and support from citizens. The objective must be to fight for as long as possible and to prevent, at worst, total capitulation in which adversaries can limitlessly dictate the terms of surrender. The AAF must be designed to accommodate and save as many military lives as possible, ensuring continued operations and support from citizens. The objective must be to fight for as long as possible and to prevent, at worst, total capitulation in which adversaries can limitlessly dictate the terms of surrender. Secondarily, the AAF must buy time for Yerevan’s diplomacy and third-party interventions to halt Azerbaijani and Turkish attacks. The AAF must implement strategy, doctrine and intent to maintain force survivability, which includes—but is not limited to—resources, manpower and morale to continue fighting. Survivability complements maneuver thinking. To implement these concepts, should the Armenian government borrow money and sacrifice taxpayer wealth to purchase the latest technology? No, because technology alone does not win wars. Unfortunately, rapid military Westernization often leads to the procurement of extremely state-of-the-art equipment that is difficult to train with or maintain. The AAF must be keenly aware of its strengths and weaknesses in order to exercise fiscal prudence when acquiring new equipment and implementing new doctrine. In the Russia-Ukraine War, very inexpensive first-person video and one-way attack drones have changed the battlefield in favor of the attacker. Lessons such as this one should be considered, rather than throwing money at the problem. At the same time, however, Yerevan must understand that some large weaknesses will require a larger portion of the military budget, such as advanced integrated air defense systems. These specific capabilities must be considered for heavy investment. A few considerations when implementing reform Armenian intelligence must be able to precisely assess well in advance: National security strengths and weaknesses; Adversarial capabilities; Adversarial intent on when, where and how the enemy may execute its missions; Vital locations for defense and national level objectives; and Performance of its intelligence duties with ample time for military and civilian decision makers to adapt and act accordingly. Yerevan must never be surprised by an attack or unprepared for its execution. Proper warning intelligence should inform decision-makers at least several days in advance, enabling effective military, diplomatic and civilian responses to thwart and deter the aggressor. If a conflict indeed breaks out, the AAF should already be prepared to execute an operational plan that targets the adversary’s “center of gravity.” For example, if Azerbaijan attacks, Armenia must target that which provides Baku the moral or physical strength, freedom of action or the will to act. If this is targeted and denied, damaged or destroyed, it can significantly weaken or defeat Baku. If successfully executed, it would limit Azerbaijan’s ability to competently continue attacking Armenia. Questions in Yerevan must be raised and answered immediately (if they have not been already), such as: “How can the AAF eliminate the enemy’s important driver(s) to maintain the battlespace in our favor?” One can argue that Azerbaijan likely identified the “land connection” between Armenia and Artsakh/Nagorno Karabakh as a center of gravity in its ultimate objective to seize Artsakh’s territory. In his book, 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, retired U.S. Colonel John Antal explains how, through maneuver warfare, Azerbaijan prioritized capturing southern, flat terrain in the Hadrut region before leveraging its air assets to target Artsakh and Armenian air defenses in the mountainous north. After gaining air superiority, Artsakh and Armenian personnel, logistics and strategic positions connecting the two became extremely vulnerable. Baku succeeded by cutting off Armenia from Artsakh through sustained fires from the air domain. It was only a matter of time before Artsakh fell—first through war (2020), then siege (2022-2023) and finally collapse (2023). Lastly, information warfare must become a relentless pillar of Armenian strategy. In War in 140 Characters, David Patrikarakos argues that Israel, despite military success in the 2014 Gaza War, lost the perception battle. Patrikarakos argued that Israel’s unorganized and unfocused engagement in social media was the primary failure in shaping global opinion. Surprisingly, he concluded that an ordinary girl’s advocacy transformed modern warfare as Western households became skeptical towards Israel unlike ever before.  A teenage Palestinian girl, Farah Baker, became what Patrikarakos calls “homo digitalis,” a modern information warrior. He credited Baker’s successful English-language skills and live tweets (now called “X posts”) which gained her a large following. This prompted major Western cable news attention, granting her interview time. Patrikarakos stated that the Israeli military has since reformed and adapted because of Baker, among others. Global perceptions of war have exponentially been shaped by social media since 2014 and War in 140 Characters. When learning from information perception campaigns, it should be asked: Does Armenia have one of the most successful and widespread diasporas? Does Armenia have an incredibly robust tech sector? Do diasporan Armenians over-represent their respective countries in media, politics, business and culture? If any of these are true, it should not be challenging for the homeland and diaspora to work with the AAF to develop formal and informal media perception campaigns. There are plenty of lessons to learn from any ongoing conflict. The ultimate goal should be to convince global powers to action—stopping attacks against Armenia. If the AAF is fighting to buy time, the domestic media wing and global diaspora should be fighting for the international community to intervene and end the assault. Conclusion Armenia must continue to challenge its outdated Soviet ways of warfighting and implement meaningful reforms at all levels of warfare: strategic (national, long-term), operational (theater-specific) and tactical (smallest levels of combat). A new Armenian military doctrine based on maneuver over attrition should not be a one-size-fits-all. Military planning is both a science and an art. It requires rigorous vision, deep self-awareness and a commitment to objectives, but is malleable in how it is executed by leveraging strengths and accommodating for weaknesses. It must require meticulous considerations and an unwavering commitment to preparation and vigilance. Armenia may be without an overtly committed ally, but Yerevan has a significant advantage in defending its territory thanks to its dynamic and well-educated population now making significant technological and economic advancements. Furthermore, Armenia’s unity under democratic values is inherently more advantageous than its unfree adversaries, as free speech and reason can shape how militaries reform, promote personnel based on merit and reward contracts that are economically viable. Armenia can survive. Author informationJack DulgarianJack Dulgarian is a Washington, D.C. based analyst and consultant working in national security and defense on Near East and Eurasian issues. He previously wrote on building a pragmatic Armenian Space Doctrine and Azerbaijan’s 2025 diplomatic strategy. In 2023, he authored an analysis scenario-casting how Russia would thwart Armenia’s security prior to the fall and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. Mr. Dulgarian has been referenced by National Defense University’s Joint Quarterly Magazine and given lectures to the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. | The post The case for a new Armenian Armed Forces doctrine appeared first on The Armenian Weekly.

CNN  —  Elon Musk raised concerns about President Donald Trump’s sweeping tax and spending cuts package, saying in a video released Tuesday that he believes it would raise the US budget deficit and undercut efforts by the Department of Government Efficiency.

Donald Trump sends congratulations to President Ilham Aliyev  Latest news from Azerbaijan

President Vladimir Putin’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine include a demand that Western leaders pledge in writing to stop enlarging NATO eastwards, according to reports.