Day: May 20, 2025

Executive Summary

• Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation, as desirable as it might be, will not come about from wishful thinking and cannot be imposed. Well-meaning Western governments should avoid pressure for normalization in the short term. 
• Successful reconciliation will require profound political and social change in Russia, for which Ukraine’s post-Soviet democratization, and nation-building experience could serve as a template.
• Reconciliation projects in other contexts have successfully relied on instrumental, historical, and structural mechanisms. However, each of these routes contains potential pitfalls for Ukraine and must be navigated carefully, if at all.
• Unfortunately, past attempts to reconcile Russia with its neighbors and former subjects offer more cautionary tales than clear guides.
• Initial steps toward genuine dialogue and eventual reconciliation could involve restorative justice, including holding accountable those responsible for crimes of war and aggression, providing reparations, repatriating abducted Ukrainian children, and collaborating on correcting distorted historical narratives.

Introduction

The end of Russia’s war in Ukraine — whether through Ukraine’s victory or defeat, a frozen conflict, or a negotiated settlement — will not automatically lead to lasting peace between the two largest powers in Eastern Europe. In the name of sustainable peace, Western leaders are likely to advocate for a rapid postwar reconciliation process, focusing on one or more of the following three reconciliation mechanisms:

1. Instrumental reconciliation through symbolic rapprochement and enhanced cooperation across various domains.
2. Historical reconciliation through transitional justice and truth-seeking.
3. Structural reconciliation through political and social reform.

However, rushing Ukraine into reconciliation without substantial changes in Russia risks increasing insecurity. Western policymakers should take a pragmatic approach to Russia’s imperial ambitions, carefully considering if and how to apply reconciliation methods, with a clear understanding of both historical and current contexts.

In essence, genuine reconciliation requires depth change in the Russian Federation, which may take generations and involve political reform and a shift in the prevailing mindset among the majority of its population. Insisting on democratic reforms in Russia is essential to avoid perpetuating insecurity.

In this, Russia may learn much from Ukraine, which serves as an invaluable case study for understanding post-Soviet democratic transformations, if it prioritizes alignment with the West. Until such reforms and shifts take root, however, Russia will likely maintain its imperialistic endeavor for decades, utilizing political, economic, and cultural influence to impede Ukraine’s democratic and economic development, reform efforts, European integration, NATO accession, and the further crystallization of Ukrainians’ national identity.

With these objectives and challenges in mind, this paper maps the minefields of potential Ukraine-Russia reconciliation. Key findings include:

• Each category of reconciliation mechanisms — instrumental, historical, and structural — poses potential risks for Ukraine and (if the time ever comes) should be cautiously implemented, considering the nuanced details of the existing and historic context.
• Given the need to contain Russia rather than seek normalization at any cost, ¹ it is unwise to impose reconciliation on Ukraine, which is actively resisting an imperial absorption. Reconciliation may not be realistic when the oppressed are fervently seeking independence without adequate political and economic safeguards. Hence, discussions on reconciliation in the West should approach Ukraine-Russia relations from a decolonial perspective.
• Without fundamental changes in the Russian Federation, such as transitioning to democracy and the government’s acknowledgment of and commitment to human rights, only “thin” reconciliation can be expected — a coexistence marked by minimal to no trust, respect, and shared values.
• At present, a small bottleneck for initiating reconciliation could potentially be alleviated through Ukraine-Russia dialogues and cooperation addressing issues such as prosecuting war criminals, transferring frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction, providing reparations to Ukraine, repatriating abducted Ukrainian children, and correcting distorted Russian historical narratives. However, such engagement will only be effective if it arises organically from the desires of Ukrainian and Russian societies. Attempts to impose such engagement from outside, especially on non-justice restoration-related topics, however well-meaning, will only shift the power balance in favor of Russia and deepen Ukrainian trauma.
• Assessing Ukraine-Russia reconciliation prospects requires avoiding historical parallels, as every context is unique. The most accurate data for projections may be obtained from analyzing Russia’s previous reconciliation attempts with Ukraine and other post-Soviet states with which it has been at war. These instances unmistakably illustrate that over the past 30 years, the Russian Federation has consistently pursued an agenda of regional domination, if not of renewed imperialism. Consequently, the limited array of reconciliation mechanisms employed by Russia has primarily functioned to diminish the target countries’ autonomy and coerce them back into the orbit of Russian influence.

What Does “Reconciliation” Entail?

Reconciliation involves transforming relationships from mutual antagonism to “mutual recognition and acceptance” at best (“thick” reconciliation) or a non-conflict coexistence that maintains peace and prevents revenge at a minimum (“thin” reconciliation).² Achieving reconciliation is particularly challenging after massive human rights violations, like those committed during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.

Reconciliation Mechanisms

While various typologies categorize reconciliation mechanisms, the following three overarching groups can be helpful:³

• Instrumental mechanisms encompass public statements and symbolic gestures by leaders across political, social, cultural, and religious spheres, alongside efforts to bolster economic, cultural, and social cooperation.
• Historical mechanisms span war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, and judicial procedures as transitional justice mechanisms. They also include memorials to honor victims and heroes and collaborative scholarly endeavors to document historical occurrences and reshape narratives.
• Structural mechanisms anticipate reforms that will assist a country in embracing changes that ensure the impartial functioning of state institutions, respect for human rights and diversity, and political inclusion.

The complexities inherent in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship pose challenges for implementing these three mechanisms.

Additionally, our emphasis has been on horizontal reconciliation (repairing relations between individuals or groups) rather than vertical reconciliation (between authorities and the people). The latter is a consideration for Russian society if it chooses to revisit the experience of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, where the personality cult and dictatorship of Joseph Stalin were denounced. Such a move may lead to some restoration of justice for political prisoners and victims of today’s Kremlin.

Context

There is no single model or toolkit for reconciliation; context is crucial.⁴

Despite Ukraine formally achieving independence in 1991, the Kremlin and some Russians have never fully accepted its sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁵ Over the centuries, peace between Ukraine and Russia has only occurred when Russia was weak or when Ukraine was under Russian occupation.⁶

The Kremlin distorts the reasons for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. ⁷ However, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Canada, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ireland have officially recognized Russia’s actions as genocide against Ukrainians through their national parliaments.⁸ Additionally, on July 13, 2022, the European Commission issued a collective statement supporting Ukraine’s actions at the International Court of Justice against Russia, based on the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.⁹

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine happened less than 100 years after another Kremlin-orchestrated genocide. The Holodomor, a grand famine in the 1930s, claimed up to 10 million Ukrainian lives.¹⁰ In the decades that followed, reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine meant silencing the horrors of genocide and enduring oppression. This denial “distorted the national mentality and produced or reinforced a variety of post-genocidal syndromes, ranging from historical amnesia to substance dependence to broken families….”¹¹ The failure to address and deter those actions laid the groundwork for the ongoing Russian atrocities.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, nearly half of Ukrainians had relatives or friends in Russia,¹² and over 20% were “Russian-speaking” (a term the Kremlin uses to imply a political identity and conflates linguistic identity with political allegiance¹³).¹⁴ However, it is essential not to be misled into thinking that there is a substantial foundation for post-atrocities reconciliation. Since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russia has waged a hybrid war against Ukraine, hindering its efforts to determine its own future.

The dynamics between the colonizer and the colonized, as evident in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship, pose significant challenges for reconciliation. Achieving meaningful reconciliation requires the colonizer to acknowledge the colonized as equals and recognize their right to self-determination, necessitating a profound political shift in Russia.

Russia has occasionally shown an interest in reconciling with its neighbors and former vassals, but this effort has been inconsistent and often driven by the desire to re-establish its dominance. Mikhail Gorbachev’s shift from the Brezhnev Doctrine, which allowed Soviet intervention to maintain the communist bloc, to the Sinatra Doctrine, which removed the threat of military intervention, paved the way for the liberations of 1989 and the reintegration of Central and Eastern Europe into the European family.¹⁵ However, when independence movements emerged within the Soviet Union, starting with the Baltics, Gorbachev hesitated.

After Gorbachev and the failed hard-line putsch that sought to oust him, post-Soviet Russia had an opportunity to change its approach. Boris Yeltsin supported Baltic independence to undermine Gorbachev and the Communist Party, accelerating Russia’s own move toward sovereignty. As a result, relations between Russia and the Baltic states were strong in the early 1990s.¹⁶ However, communist, nationalist, and populist politicians stoked resentment over the lost empire and feared the growing national identities of various nations, weaponizing the narrative of alleged oppression of Russian-speaking populations. This created friction between Moscow and the newly independent states, from Belarus and Moldova in the west to Tajikistan in the east, with Ukraine caught in the middle.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the two unjustified Chechen wars clearly demonstrated that Russia remained the true heir of the Soviet Union: using military force to suppress separatist movements and maintain control over its territories. By the time Yeltsin left office at the end of 1999, even Russia’s economic-minded reformers were talking about a “liberal empire.¹⁸

Initially, Putin used reconciliation as a tool of economic diplomacy, offering apologies for the 1956 and 1968 invasions and the Katyń massacre to improve relations with Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. However, as Putin came increasingly to rely on nationalist rhetoric at home and on the rehabilitation of the memory of the Soviet empire in particular, the Kremlin saw confrontation with its former colonies as both inevitable and desirable.¹⁹ The Kremlin believed it needed political, economic, and military domination in its “near abroad” to feel secure at home, making genuine reconciliation impossible.²⁰

Reconciliation with an empire-minded aggressor is possible under one of the following scenarios:

1. Complete military defeat of the aggressor, followed by its democratization and pacification.
2. Gradual democratization of the aggressor through historical processes, a willingness to liberate colonies, and the ability to build cooperative relationships, though not always fully addressing past injustices.
3. An oppressive situation where victim states lack the resources and international support to resist imperial ambitions, leading to forced “thin” reconciliation and survival through subjugation or occupation.
4. The victim state’s ability to join security alliances or obtain security commitments from powerful countries to counter the aggressor and achieve “thin” reconciliation, depending on changing context.

For Ukraine to follow the path of Poland rather than Georgia or Belarus, it must be accepted into the European Union (EU) and NATO as soon as possible. Unfortunately, NATO membership remains a distant dream rather than an immediate goal, given the Alliance’s unwillingness to escalate tensions with Russia, despite Finland’s recent accession increasing NATO’s border with Russia.

Before exploring the threats to Ukraine within a classical reconciliation mechanism, it is helpful to review recent attempts at reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia.

Overview of Recent Ukraine-Russia Reconciliation Initiatives

Since Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, the international community has implemented several initiatives aimed at establishing dialogue and facilitating reconciliation in Ukraine.²¹

Most of these initiatives focused on internal reconciliation rather than dialogue between the countries. For example, they aimed to foster understanding between citizens in occupied and government-controlled territories or between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their host communities. The “Restoration of Governance and Reconciliation in Crisis-Affected Communities of Ukraine” project, co-led by  UNDP, UN Women, the Swedish International Development Agency, and The Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development, was funded by the European Union.  Additionally, the “Break the Ice” initiative, supported by the US Embassy in Kyiv, worked on reconciling and reintegrating internally displaced children by providing a peaceful and safe environment for learning, developing, and strengthening resilience.²²

The Ukrainian government and civil society have also driven several reconciliation initiatives.²³ Launched in 2020, the National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity, aimed to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to peace and dialogue. Additionally, the International Centre for Policy Studies, a Ukrainian think tank, worked on the “Initiating the Participatory National Dialogue in Ukraine” project.²⁴ These are just a few of the many national and local initiatives that showcase Ukraine’s openness to constructive dialogue within its society and its respect for sovereignty.

Few initiatives openly recognized the Russian Federation as a party to the conflict and reconciliation efforts. For example, in 2018–19, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission between Russia and Ukraine, with the Mediation of the European Union, drafted recommendations for peace between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the democratic world. Believing that the Russian Federation should one day be reintegrated into the broader family of democratic nations, the commission noted that Russia “must first carry out work within itself to integrate the democratic principles that it accepted theoretically after 1991…and repair the wrongs committed against its neighbors.”²⁵ The commission specifically underlined the need to “reject any naivety towards a State that seriously destabilizes the international order.”²⁶

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, drastically changed the context, leaving no room for manipulation and linguistic games in political discourse. Russia was recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism,²⁷ the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin,²⁸ and there are discussions about establishing a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.²⁹ The report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine presents evidence of a wide range of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in Ukraine and Russia, committed on the order of the Russian government and supported by Russian citizens.³⁰ These war crimes include willful killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful confinement, torture, rape, forced transfers, and deportations of children, etc.³¹

As of June 2023, a majority (78%) of Ukrainians have close relatives or friends who have been injured or killed due to the Russian invasion.³² The war has created almost 7 million IDPs and 6 million refugees.³³ Meanwhile, no anti-war protest in Russia has managed to attract 100,000 people so far.³⁴ Ties between Ukrainians and their relatives, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances in Russia have been severely damaged since the full-scale invasion.³⁵

Instrumental mechanisms

Symbolic Gestures and Statements of Politicians and Civic Leaders

Statements of respect, apologies for harm suffered, or other symbolic gestures by political, social, cultural, and religious leaders are important for reconciliation.³⁶ Notable examples include German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s demonstration of respect to the victims of Nazis at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970 and the visits of US President Barack Obama to Hiroshima and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Pearl Harbor in 2016.

“The two leaders’ visit will showcase the power of reconciliation that has turned former adversaries into the closest of allies,” the White House said in a statement about the 2016 visit by Obama and Abe to the USS Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor.³⁷ It is important to note that Germany and Japan were defeated in World War II and underwent significant internal changes (which to some are not complete), which helped overcome the ideological differences that had caused the conflicts before these gestures were possible.

Putin is unlikely to acknowledge the Ukrainian victims of the ongoing war.³⁸ It is doubtful that his successor will be substantially different, especially if power transitions within the current elite. Even the Russian opposition lacks consensus on strategies for restoring relations with Ukraine, as Russia’s imperialistic agenda remains popular among the general population.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues its nuclear threats and intensifies anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda.³⁹ First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on International Affairs, Alexei Chepa, emphasized that reconciliation directly depends on developments at the front line.⁴⁰

Despite severe punishment in Russia for anti-war “propaganda,” there have been anti-war protests and statements by officers, some representatives of academia, intelligentsia, and civil society.⁴¹ Russian researcher Yury Terekhov identified over 100 anti-war initiatives in Russia and abroad, ranging from fundraising for the Ukrainian army’s needs to decolonization art projects.⁴²

Notable gestures include Russian lawyers endorsing the “Tribunal for Putin” and the support the Moscow-based human rights group Memorial has provided to a Ukrainian human rights defender and a prisoner of the Kremlin anti-fascist Maxym Butkevych.⁴³ An Anti-War Committee member and businessman, Yevgeny Chichvarkin, provided $2.5 million in aid to Ukraine.⁴⁴ Russian opposition leader Vladimir Kara-Murza’s statements led to the first instance of the strictest punishment for anti-war rhetoric under new Russian legislation: 25 years in prison.⁴⁵

However, such efforts are overshadowed by pro-war declarations, silence, and the indifference of the majority of the Russian population.⁴⁶ In the near future, only Russian civil society actors who have not stayed silent and indifferent can take the first small step toward reconciliation with Ukraine. They can initiate a “hard talk” with Russian society, challenge current historical narratives, promote justice for victims, and condemn perpetrators, thereby setting the stage for the application of historical reconciliation mechanisms.

This would also require extensive efforts to enforce the rule of law, which involves structural reforms. For reconciliation within Russia, it is essential to bring justice to victims of the regime, like tortured anti-war poet Artem Kamardin and artist Sasha Skochilenko.⁴⁷ An honest internal discussion within the Russian society should precede any reconciliation efforts between Russians and the oppressed peoples.

In addition to addressing individual criminal guilt for war crimes in Ukraine, promoting discussions about the collective political responsibility of the Russian people is essential. The late US historian and political philosopher Hannah Arendt demonstrated how building any dictatorship requires the integration and normalization of that regime in the minds of its citizens. She emphasized that it is humans’ duty to prevent evil.⁴⁸ Both Arendt and the late German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers believed that society can be changed only through the acceptance of political responsibility.⁴⁹ Most Ukrainians believe this too.

One of the few Russian intellectuals who agrees with this idea is Vladimir Sorokin. “As a Russian, I unquestionably share in the collective responsibility for the unleashed war. However, I am also compelled to ask myself personally: what specific actions did I neglect to prevent this war?”, Sorokin said in an interview with Radio Liberty. “I believe every sensible person asks themselves the same question. This guilt will continue to grow even after the war ends; we will carry it within ourselves. We Russians will all bear this bitter burden. Each of us will carry our own stone on our back. The weight and size of each stone will be determined individually. But we are all culpable, not just Putin and his team. The issue lies in the fact that, similar to the Stalinist era, the regime is upheld by the existence of millions who share the same consciousness, ethics, and rhetoric as figures like Stalin or Putin.”⁵⁰

The Role of The Church

The church played a pivotal role in initiating German-Polish reconciliation in the 1950s.⁵¹ In Ukraine and Russia, both multi-confessional societies, various religious organizations could potentially contribute to promoting repentance and forgiveness. However, it is unlikely to involve the Russian Orthodox Church or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which are the largest denominations in both countries.⁵²

The moral leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is questionable. According to a Royal United Services Institute report, the ROC supports Russian information operations, and its priests are recruited by Russian special services.  Patriarch Kirill, known for his KGB past, supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, stating that dying in war “washes away the sins.”  This statement starkly contradicts the Sixth Commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” Moreover, he claims that the war in Ukraine is defensive and that the people of Ukraine have been seduced by Western “forces of evil”.  This stance undermines the ROC’s potential role in fostering genuine reconciliation.

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the spiritual head of the world’s Orthodox Christians, said that the ROC shares responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine. However, he also expressed his readiness to assist in Russia’s postwar “spiritual regeneration.”⁵³

The communists established the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) to control believers within Ukraine and to participate in foreign intelligence activities.⁵⁴ Currently, the UOC-MP is not only formally affiliated with the ROC but also infiltrated by Russian intelligence officers and collaborators.⁵⁵  Some priests have even participated in laying the ground for the acceptance of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and later provided Ukrainian armed forces’ positions to the enemy.

Given the political nature of the UOC-MP, Ukraine had to balance ensuring religious freedom with safeguarding national security.⁵⁶ Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale aggression, based on Ukraine Security Service reports, 68 criminal cases have been launched against members of the UOC-MP, including 14 involving metropolitans. These include20 cases of treason, collaborationism, and aiding Russia, 18 cases of incitement to religious hatred, firearms sales, and child pornography distribution.⁵⁷ As a result, 19 priests have lost their Ukrainian citizenship.⁵⁸

The ROC is unlikely to find a reconciliation partner in the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which was granted autocephaly (self-governorship) by Constantinople in October 2018.⁵⁹ This recognition as the sole canonical successor of the Kyiv Metropolitanate from the 10th to 12th centuries, the church of the Kyivan Rus era, restores historical justice and counters the Kremlin’s distorted history. The Kyiv Metropolitanate was under the direct jurisdiction of Constantinople from the adoption of Christianity in 988 until the late 17th century, when it was non-canonically annexed by the Moscow Patriarchate.

The ROC, the largest patriarchate in the Orthodox world, effectively supports genocide.⁶⁰ The “Russian world” concept incorporates various Christian ideas manipulated to serve the Kremlin’s political agenda. Therefore, any attempts by the Russian regime to use the ROC to hide current political strategies with a distorted version of reconciliation should be rejected.⁶¹

Strengthening Economic Cooperation

After the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia consistently used economic cooperation to influence Ukraine’s domestic politics. Significant examples include the 2010 “Kharkiv Agreements,” which extended Russia’s Black Sea Fleet presence in Ukraine by 25 years in exchange for a 30% discount on Russian gas and a $15 billion loan.⁶² Another instance was Russia’s obstruction of Ukraine signing the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013.⁶³ Russia imposed export restrictions and warned that signing the agreement would be “suicidal” for Ukraine. ⁶⁴

Russia uses debt relief, bank bailouts, preferential trade agreements, oil and gas export discounts, nuclear power cooperation, and extensive commercial engagement to advance both its economic interests and global political influence. By buying out local politicians, Russia introduces political corruption and weakens democratic institutions in its “partner” countries. In 2022, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council banned 11 political parties with ties to Russia in response to national security threats.⁶⁵

Ukraine’s efforts to reduce economic dependence on Russia have come at a high human cost, with hundreds killed during the Revolution of Dignity and thousands more in the ongoing war. Since 2014, Ukraine has actively shifted its main trading partner from Russia to the EU.⁶⁶ In 2022, sanctions and the freezing of asset further reduced Russian influence.⁶⁷ If Russia becomes involved in the reconstruction of Ukraine b…